Navy CVN-21 Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress by O'Rourke, Ronald
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RS20643
Updated August 20, 2004
Navy CVN-21 Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Current Administration plans call for procuring the Navy’s next aircraft carrier,
called CVN-21, in FY2007.  The Navy in early 2004 estimated that CVN-21 would cost
a total of about $3.1 billion develop and $8.6 billion to procure, for a total acquisition
cost of about $11.7 billion.  Advance procurement “down payments” on this ship have
been approved by Congress each year since FY2001. 
On August 19, 2004, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that the estimated
development cost for a 3-ship carrier program (CVN-21 plus two sister ships to be
procured years after CVN-21) had increased by $728 million, to $4.33 billion.  DOD
now estimates that the program would have a total acquisition cost of about $36.1
billion ($4.33 billion for development and $31.75 billion for procurement), or an
average of about $12 billion per ship.  If much of the $728-million increase in the
estimated development cost is for the CVN-21 itself, then CVN-21’s estimated
acquisition cost may now be more than $12 billion. 
In mid-August 2004, it was reported that the Navy’s draft FY2006-FY2011
shipbuilding plan would delay procurement of CVN-21 by one year, to FY2008.  Based
on past data for carrier construction programs, such a delay might increase the
procurement cost of the ship by a few or several hundred million dollars, which could
increase its total acquisition cost to well over $12 billion, and possibly something closer
to $13 billion.  This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
The Navy’s Current Carrier Force.  DOD plans currently call for maintaining
a Navy with 12 aircraft carriers.  The current carrier force includes 2 conventionally
powered carriers (the Kitty Hawk [CV-63], and the John F. Kennedy [CV-67]) and 10
nuclear-powered carriers (the one-of-a-kind Enterprise [CVN-65]) and 9 Nimitz-class
ships [CVN-68 through -76].  The most recently commissioned carrier, the Ronald
Reagan (CVN-76), was procured in FY1995 at a cost of $4.45 billion and entered service
in July 2003 as the replacement for the Constellation (CV-64).  The next carrier, the
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George H. W. Bush (CVN-77), was procured in FY2001 at a cost of $4.97 billion and is
scheduled to enter service in 2008 as the replacement for the Kitty Hawk.
The Aircraft Carrier Construction Industrial Base.  All U.S. aircraft carriers
procured since FY1958 have been built by Northrop Grumman’s Newport News
Shipbuilding (NGNN) of Newport News, VA — the only U.S. shipyard that can build
large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.  The aircraft carrier construction industrial
base also includes hundreds of subcontractors and suppliers in dozens of states.
Navy Aircraft Carrier Acquisition Programs.  Navy aircraft carrier acquisition
efforts currently revolve around CVN-77 and the CVN-21 program.  Each of these is
discussed below.
CVN-77.   Congress approved $4,053.7 million in FY2001 procurement funding to
complete CVN-77’s total procurement cost of $4,974.9 million.  The ship, which was
named in honor of former president George H. W. Bush on December 9, 2002, was
originally to include new-design radars and a new-design combat system known as the
Integrated Warfare System (IWS) to be made by an industry team led by Lockheed
Martin.  During 2002, however, the Navy backed away from this plan and announced that
the ship would instead be equipped with older-design radars and a combat system similar
to those used by previous Nimitz-class carriers.  The conference report (H.Rept. 107-732
of October 9, 2002) on the FY2003 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 5010/P.L. 107-248)
provided an additional $90 million for CVN-77 for IWS and contained language directing
the Navy to build the ship with an advanced combat system (page 185).
CVN-21 Program.  In August 2004, DOD began describing the CVN-21 program
as a 3-ship program encompassing CVN-21 and two sister ships to be procured years after
CVN-21.  (CVN-21 simply means aircraft carrier for the 21st Century.)  On August 19,
2004, the Department of Defense (DOD) reported that the estimated development cost for
the 3-ship program had increased by $728 million, to $4.33 billion.  DOD now estimates
that the 3-ship program would have a total acquisition cost of about $36.1 billion ($4.33
billion for development and $31.75 billion for procurement), or an average of about $12
billion per ship.
CVN-21 (also called CVN-78).  The Navy wants to procure CVN-21 (also known
as CVN-78) in FY2007 and commission it into service in 2014 as the replacement for the
Enterprise (CVN-65), which would then be 53 years old.  The Navy in early 2004
estimated that CVN-21 would cost about $3.1 billion to develop and $8.6 billion to
procure, for a total acquisition cost of about $11.7 billion.  The $3.1 billion in estimated
development costs for the CVN-21 represented most of the previously reported estimated
development cost for the 3-ship program.  In light of this, much of the $728-million
increase in the total development cost for the 3-ship program might be due to an increase
in the estimated development cost for CVN-21 itself.  If so, then CVN-21’s estimated
acquisition cost may now be more than $12 billion.
In mid-August 2004, it was reported that the Navy’s draft FY2006-FY2011
shipbuilding plan would delay procurement of CVN-21 by one year, to FY2008.  Based
on past data for carrier construction programs, such a delay might increase the
procurement cost of the ship by a few or several hundred million dollars, which could
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1 For more on naval transformation, see CRS Report RS20851, Naval Transformation,
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increase its total acquisition cost to well over $12 billion, and possibly something closer
to $13 billion.
Through FY2004, Congress approved $1,729.7 million in advanced procurement
funding and $1,142.3 million in development funding for CVN-21.  The Administration’s
proposed FY2005 defense budget requested $626.1 million in procurement funding and
$327.3 million in development funding for the ship.
The Navy originally wanted the carrier after CVN-77 to be a completely new-design
aircraft carrier (hence its initial name of CVNX-1, rather than CVN-78).  In May 1998,
however, the Navy announced that it could not afford to develop an all-new design for the
ship and would instead continue to modify the Nimitz-class design with each new carrier
that is procured.  Under this strategy, CVN-77 and CVNX-1 were to be, technologically,
the first and second ships in an evolutionary series of  carrier designs.
Compared to the baseline Nimitz-class design, CVNX-1 was to require 300 to 500
fewer sailors to operate and would feature an entirely new and less expensive nuclear
reactor plant, a new electrical distribution system, and an electromagnetic (as opposed to
steam-powered) aircraft catapult system.  In large part because of the reduction in crew
size, CVNX-1 was projected to have a lower life-cycle operation and support (O&S) cost
than the baseline Nimitz-class design.  CVNX-1 was to cost $2.54 billion to develop and
$7.48 billion to procure, giving it a total acquisition cost of $10.02 billion.
In May 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed DOD offices to
reexamine the need for 5 major defense acquisition programs, including CVNX-1.  In
response, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) began studying several
alternatives to the Navy’s carrier acquisition plan, including procuring smaller
conventional carriers instead of large nuclear-powered carriers; procuring a repeat version
of CVN-77 in FY2007 instead of CVNX-1; and skipping procurement of CVNX-1.
In November and December 2002, after reviewing these alternatives, OSD decided
to alter the design of CVNX-1 to incorporate additional advanced features originally
intended for CVNX-2 (the name at the time for the next carrier after CVNX-1).  These
changes included a new and enlarged flight deck, an increased allowance for future
technologies (including electric weapons), and additional manpower reductions.
Compared to the baseline Nimitz-class design, the ship would now require at least 500
fewer sailors to operate.  To signify these changes, the ship’s name was changed from
CVNX-1 to CVN-21.  Incorporating the changes increased the ship’s development cost
by about $600 million and its procurement cost by about $700 million.  OSD reportedly
did not consider CVNX-1 sufficiently transformational; the CVN-21 proposal appears
intended to increase the transformational content of the ship.1
The Navy in the latter months of 2002 proposed to fund the procurement of CVNX-
1/CVN-21 starting in FY2004 through the Navy’s research and development account
rather than the Navy’s ship-procurement account, known formally as the Shipbuilding and
Conversion, Navy (SCN) account.  In December 2002, however, it was reported that the
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2  The Navy reportedly wanted to start funding the procurement of CVNX-1/CVN-21 through the
Navy’s research and development account in part because the new technologies to be
incorporated into CVNX-1/CVN-21 give it somewhat the character of a research and
development activity as opposed to a straight procurement action.  The Navy reportedly believed
that funding procurement of the ship through the research and development account would permit
the Navy to better manage the technical and cost risks involved in developing and building the
ship.  Items acquired through research and development accounts are not subject to the full
funding policy as traditionally applied to DOD weapon procurement programs.  If procured
through the research and development account, the Navy would be able, for example, to fund the
procurement of CVN-21 using a stream of annual funding increments — a funding strategy that,
when used in funding items procured through DOD procurement accounts, is called incremental
funding.  Such a strategy would reduce the financial strain that procurement of CVN-21 would
place on the Navy budget in any single year.  Congress, however, imposed the full funding policy
on DOD in the 1950s in part to end the use of incremental funding in defense procurement,
because it was viewed as having disadvantages in terms of reducing DOD budgeting discipline
and making the total costs of weapons less visible. For a discussion, see CRS Report RL31404,
Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy — Background, Issues, and Options for Congress,
by Ronald O’Rourke and Stephen Daggett.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) objected to this proposal.  As a result, the
Pentagon is proposing to fund the procurement of CVN-21 through the SCN account.2
CVN-79.  Navy plans have called for procuring CVN-79 (previously called the
CVN-21 Follow-On and, before that, CVNX-2) in FY2011 and commission it into service
in 2018 as the replacement for the John F. Kennedy, which will then be 50 years old.
Initial advance procurement funding for CVN-79 is currently programmed for FY2007.
If, however, procurement of CVN-21 is delayed a year, to FY2008, then it is possible that
procurement of CVN-79 could also be delayed by a year, to FY2012, which could delay
initial advance procurement funding a year, to FY2008.   Compared to CVN-21, CVN-79
would feature a more significantly redesigned flight deck, an electromagnetic arresting
gear, and possibly hull-design improvements, including reactive armor protection. 
CVN-80.  This is the third ship in the 3-ship CVN-21 program.  It nominally would
be procured a few years after procurement of CVN-79.
Table 1 on the next page shows procurement and development funding for CVN-21
and CVN-79 through FY2009.
Potential Issues for Congress
Affordability, Cost Effectiveness, and Potential Alternatives.  With an
estimated average acquisition cost of about $12 billion per ship, would the 3 carriers in
the CVN-21 program be affordable and cost effective?  Supporters could argue that in
spite of their cost, carriers are flexible platforms that in recent years have proven
themselves highly valuable in various U.S. military operations, particularly where U.S.
access to overseas bases has been absent or constrained.  Carriers, they could argue, have
been useful not only not only for operating strike fighters and other tactical aircraft, but
also for embarking Army forces (as during the 1994 Haiti crisis) and special operations
forces (as in the 2001-2002 war in Afghanistan).  Supporters could also argue that
Congress is already heavily committed to procuring CVN-21, having approved more than
$3.8 billion of the ship’s total acquisition cost from FY2001 to FY2005.
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Table 1.  Procurement and Development Funding for
CVN-21 and CVN-79, FY2001-FY2009
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
thru 2009
Procurement (Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy [SCN] account)
21 21.7 135.3 395.5 1177.2 626.1 611.9 2806.8 2830.1 0 8604.6
79 0 0 0 0 0 0 162.1 420.8 1568.6 2151.5*
Development (Navy research and development account)
21 230.5 276.5 318.5 316.8 327.3 298.7 232.9 210.1 152.5 2363.8*
79 0 5.0 0 0 0 0 0 191.6 315.8 512.4*
Source: Data provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, February 17, 2004.
* Additional funding to be provided in FY2009 and future years.
21= CVN-21; 79 = CVN-79
Skeptics, while acknowledging the operational value of large carriers, could question
whether, in light of their cost, there might be more cost effective alternatives.  Potential
alternatives include, among other things, smaller carriers about the size of today’s Wasp
(LHD-1) class amphibious assault ships, which might cost roughly $3 billion to procure;
UAV/UCAV carriers (which would be designed to embark air wings composed mostly
of unmanned air vehicles [UAVs] and unmanned combat air vehicles [UCAVs]); and very
small carriers, such as high-speed ships large enough to embark roughly half a dozen
manned tactical aircraft each.  Skeptics could argue that, even though substantial funds
have already been appropriated for CVN-21, not all of these funds have been expended,
and that, if large carriers are not cost effective compared to alternatives, Congress should
not “throw good money after bad” by continuing to fund CVN-21.
Funding Profile and Full Funding Policy.  The Navy in its current budget has
divided the final portion of CVN-21’s procurement cost between FY2007 and FY2008.
The Navy apparently adopted this approach, which is called split funding, in part to
reduce financial strain on the FY2007 budget.  Split funding is a departure from the full
funding policy — a defense budgeting rule that requires the full procurement cost of any
item procured through the procurement title of the defense appropriations act to be
provided in the year in which the item is procured.3  Potential questions to consider
include Should CVN-21 be procured with split funding?  Would this set a precedent for
using split funding to procure other DOD weapons?  What effect would split funding or
a large amount of advance procurement funding for CVN-21 have on adherence to the full
funding policy?  What would be the impact on the procurement schedules and costs of
other Navy procurement programs if split funding were not used?
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Legislative Activity For FY2005
FY2005 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 4200/S. 2400).  The House Armed
Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept 108-491 of May 14, 2004), on H.R. 4200,
recommended approval of the FY2005 funding R&D and procurement funding requests
for the CVN-21 program.  The committee also recommended a $10-million increase in
program element (PE) 0603512N (Carrier Systems Development) within the Navy’s
research and development account for the Aviation Ship Integration Center.  (Page 171;
see also page 158.)
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 108-260 of May 11, 2004)
on S. 2400, recommended approval of the FY2005 funding R&D and procurement
funding requests for the CVN-21 program.  The committee also recommended a $9-
million increase in PE 0603512N (Carrier Systems Development) within the Navy’s
research and development account for the Aviation Ship Integration Center.  (Page 185;
see also page 169.)  The report also recommended a $15-million increase in the Navy’s
shipbuilding account for the power unit assembly facility (PUAF).  (Page 82.)
FY2005 Defense Appropriations Bill (H.R. 4613/S. 2559).  The House
Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 108-553 of June 18, 2004) on H.R.
4613, recommended approval of the FY2005 R&D and procurement funding requests for
the CVN-21 program.  The committee also recommended a $7.5-million increase in PE
0603512N (Carrier Systems Development) within the Navy’s research and development
account for the Sentinel Net anti-terrorism and force-protection system ($1.5 million),
surface ship composite moisture separators ($4 million, to be used only for design,
development, testing, and manufacture of composite radar absorbing moisture separators),
and the Aviation Ship Integration Center ($2 million). (Page 273).  The committee also
recommended $2 million to begin a program to replace eroded propellers on existing
carriers with new-design propellers rather than refurbished propellers of the existing
design.  (Page 172).
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 108-284 of June 24,
2004) on S. 2559, recommended a $140.9-million reduction in the FY2005 procurement
funding request for CVN-21 on the grounds that this portion of the request was premature
(page 83; see also page 82).  The committee also recommended a $5-million increase in
PE 0603512N (Carrier Systems Development) within the Navy’s research and
development account for the Aviation Ship Integration Center.  (Page 153; see also page
148.)
The conference report (H.Rept. 108-622) on H.R. 4613 recommended approval of
the FY2005 procurement funding request for the CVN-21 program.  (Page 185).  The
report also recommended a $7.2-million increase in PE 0603512N (Carrier Systems
Development) within the Navy’s research and development account for the Sentinel Net
anti-terrorism and force-protection system ($1.1 million), surface ship composite moisture
separators ($2.4 million, to be used only for design, development, testing, and
manufacture of composite radar absorbing moisture separators), and the Aviation Ship
Integration Center ($3.7 million). (Page 295; see also page 276.)
